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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-4702 
 
 
CHRISTINA PAOLI, 
also known as Christina Daum, 
 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STETSER, Trooper; LAYFIELD, Corporal; ROWLEY, Trooper; 
RALSTON, Corporal; CARLYLE, Corporal; O'NEIL, Trooper; 
WARRINGTON, Corporal; BARNETT, Sergeant; WHALEY, Retired Sgt.; 
HARDY, Retired Lt.; DIXON, Captain; DELAWARE STATE POLICE TROOP 7 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
 (D. C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00066) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gregory M. Sleet  
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 on February 12, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2016) 
 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
  
 A series of encounters with the Delaware State Police prompted Christina Paoli to 
file a civil rights action against a group of officers.  The District of Delaware granted 
summary judgment in favor of all defendants.  Paoli now appeals from the grant of 
summary judgment against one of the defendant officers.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 On March 5, 2011, Delaware State Trooper Ashley Stetser responded to a call 
related to a dispute in Unit 303 of the Summerlyn Condos in Lewes, Delaware.  Trooper 
Stetser made contact with Paoli as well as three men, who, Stetser learned, had sub-
leased Unit 303 from Paoli.  Stetser heard Paoli make harassing comments to the three 
men and attempt to engage in verbal confrontations with them.  Paoli refused to stop 
harassing the men.  Stetser arrested Paoli for harassment in violation of 11 Del. C. § 
1311.  He transported Paoli to a Justice of the Peace, where she was arraigned and 
ordered to have no contact with the residents of Unit 303. 
 Two days later, Delaware State Police were informed that Paoli had violated the 
No Contact Order, a misdemeanor in Delaware.  Acting pursuant to a warrant for Paoli’s 
arrest, Trooper Joshua Rowley was dispatched to the Summerlyn Condos to assist in 
apprehending Paoli.  At the Condos, Rowley learned that Paoli had fled from her condo 
at Unit 305 to the north parking lot at the complex.   While officers searched the 
condominium complex, Paoli made a phone call to 911 and spoke to a dispatcher.  Radio 
dispatch advised the officers in the area that Paoli was making this call, and dispatch 
traced Paoli’s location to the north parking lot.  Based on this information, Trooper 
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Rowley approached a motor home in the complex’s north parking lot.  According to 
Paoli’s complaint, all of the windows of this motor home were covered and all of the 
doors were locked.  Trooper Rowley claims that one of the doors was open and he could 
see inside.  Rowley also claims to have heard movement inside the motor home.  Based 
on these observations, Rowley was directed by his supervisor to enter the motor home.  
He did so, and Paoli was inside, at which point other officers made an arrest. 
 Paoli, acting pro se, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Delaware 
State Police Troop 7 and eleven individual officers at the scene for civil rights violations 
stemming from this arrest.  All defendants moved for summary judgment.  The 
Magistrate Judge assigned to the case issued a report recommending that summary 
judgment be entered for all defendants except for Trooper Rowley, who filed timely 
objections to the report.  The District Court sustained Rowley’s objections and adopted 
the remainder of the report, entering summary judgment for all defendants.  Paoli appeals 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Rowley only. 
II.1 
 Paoli alleges that Trooper Rowley’s entry into the motor home where she was 
found was an unreasonable search or seizure.  Rowley responds that this entry was not 
unreasonable, and in the alternative, that he is entitled to qualified immunity.  The 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment is plenary.  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 
322 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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District Court concluded Rowley would be entitled to summary judgment on either of 
these grounds.   
 Qualified immunity bars claims against government officials “as long as those 
officials’ actions ‘d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.’”2  Thus, a court ruling on qualified 
immunity must decide two issues:  (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, show a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether such 
right was clearly established in light of the specific factual context.3  The court may 
decide the question of whether there was a “clearly established right” without first 
determining if a violation of a constitutional right occurred.4  We will first consider 
whether Paoli has asserted a right that was clearly established. 
A. 
 The “clearly established” right Paoli seeks to have vindicated is the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.5  However, 
whether a right has been “clearly established” depends on “the specific context of the 
case,” and the right at issue may not be simply “a broad general proposition.”6  For a 
right to be “clearly established,” the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
                                              
2 Burns v. Pa. Dep’t Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)) (alteration in original). 
3 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
4 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
5 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
6 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
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reasonable official would know that his conduct violates that right.7  Thus, Paoli must 
demonstrate that a specific Fourth Amendment right—not merely a general right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures—was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
violation, based on the specific context of her case. 
 The circumstances set forth in Paoli’s complaint are straightforward: Trooper 
Rowley, acting pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for Paoli, entered a motor home in 
search of Paoli.  Less straightforward is the law governing the reasonableness of this 
entry.  It is well-settled that “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly 
carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when 
there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”8  If an officer does not have reason to 
believe a suspect resides at the dwelling to be searched, he may not enter the home to 
effect an arrest without obtaining a search warrant for the home in the absence of exigent 
circumstances.9   
 Here, however, there is a question whether we are dealing with a dwelling or a 
motor vehicle.  Paoli acknowledges that when she was arrested, she was in a “motor 
home.”  The Supreme Court has held that if a motor home is being used as a vehicle, 
rather than a residence, the expectation of privacy is diminished because of the “ready 
                                              
7 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
8 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). 
9 See United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. 2016) (requiring officers to 
have reason to believe that an arrestee lives in the residence subject to a Payton search 
and otherwise treating the home as a third party’s home); see also Steagald v. United 
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (requiring a search warrant to search for subject of arrest 
warrant in a third party’s home). 
 6 
 
mobility” and the lower expectation of privacy with respect to a motor vehicle.10  The 
motor home was located in the Condo Complex’s  parking lot, not in a trailer park with 
other motor homes.  There was no indication that it was being used as a residence rather 
than a vehicle.  Rowley was told by radio dispatch that this suspect’s location had been 
traced to the north parking lot, where the motor home was located.  As the District Court 
found on reviewing the undisputed evidence, Rowley also heard noises from inside the 
motor home.  Because of the location from which Paoli had made the call and the noise 
from within the motor home, Rowley had probable cause to believe that Paoli was inside 
it and he had a warrant for her arrest.    
   Qualified immunity exists to give “government officials breathing room to make 
reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those 
who knowingly violate the law.”11  Trooper Rowley was acting under the direction of a 
superior officer in an attempt to apprehend a suspect for whom an arrest warrant had been 
issued after she violated a No Contact Order.  Based on the facts before Rowley at the 
time, there is no reason to think that he was plainly incompetent or knowingly violating 
the law.  At the time of Rowley’s entry, he could not ascertain if this “motor home” 
qualified as a dwelling or a motor vehicle.  He certainly had reason to believe that the 
motor home might be driven away by Paoli.  Because of this gray area between motor 
vehicles and dwellings, we hold that Paoli has not articulated a violation of a clearly 
established right.  
                                              
10 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985). 
11 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)). 
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B. 
  Because Paoli’s rights were not clearly established at the time of Rowley’s entry, 
we need not determine whether Rowley’s entry was unreasonable.  We therefore 
conclude that Rowley is entitled to qualified immunity, and we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
